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Rebalancing, Growth, and Development in a Multipolar  
Global Economy 
Zia Qureshi
Since its launch at the Pittsburgh summit in 2009, the G-20 
Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth and 
related Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) has rapidly emerged 
as the main instrument for economic policy coordination in 
the G-20. Members engage in a mutual assessment of the con-
sistency of their national policies and plans with the group’s 
shared growth and development objectives. The IMF and the 
World Bank assist in this process by providing technical inputs, 
working with other international institutions as needed, such 
as the OECD, ILO, WTO, and UNCTAD. The World Bank’s 
contributions to the MAP provide a focus on emerging markets 
and other developing countries and highlight links between de-
velopment and the global growth and stability agenda. Through 
its participation in this process, the Bank also endeavors to 
bring into the G-20 discussions the perspective of those devel-
oping countries, including low-income countries, that are not 
G-20 members. 
Currently, a central focus of the MAP is the development of 
a framework to address excessive external imbalances. At last 
month’s G-20 ministerial meetings, agreement was reached on 
a set of indicators and guidelines to identify large and persistent 
imbalances that may require corrective action. More conten-
tious discussions lie ahead in the next stage when these imbal-
ances are subjected to more detailed scrutiny and needed policy 
adjustments are discussed. In this work on imbalances, the 
World Bank is drawing attention to the links between rebalanc-
ing external positions and growth and development.
Rebalancing with Growth
External current account imbalances that grew appreciably in 
the run-up to the global financial crisis narrowed during the 
ensuing recession. IMF analysis and projections show that part 
of the narrowing was cyclical and that, absent policy adjust-
ments, the imbalances could widen again as the world economy 
recovers (figure 1). There is concern that large and widening 
imbalances could threaten economic stability and the sustain-
ability of growth.
Imbalances, when they are unsustainable, must be ad-
dressed, and the World Bank (with the IMF) is supporting the 
current G-20 work on this issue. But, as the Bank has empha-
sized in its contributions to the discussions, in this work we 
must keep in clear view the bigger picture―the main objective 
of the MAP―which is growth. The focus ought to be on reforms 
that maximize sustainable growth, not on external imbalances 
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in and of themselves. Rebalancing should not be a zero-sum 
game, rotating demand from one to another: the objective is to 
lift growth, not just shift growth. Imbalances and how they are 
addressed must be placed in the context of a broader G-20 
agenda on how to ensure strong and sustainable growth in the 
postcrisis global economy. The concern with external imbal-
ances, while warranted, must not divert attention from what is 
really needed―and that is reforms at home. A growth-oriented 
approach to rebalancing would have two important elements:
•	 A strong focus on structural reforms that address the under-
lying, fundamental drivers of the imbalances, and
•	 Leveraging of the role of developing countries in supporting 
strong and balanced global growth.
Structural Drivers of Imbalances
All imbalances are not bad: some reflect the normal workings 
of globalization, market-driven differences in saving and invest-
ment performance and competitiveness, and differences in 
stages of development that may not be a threat to global stabil-
ity. Some reflect economies’ fundamental structural character-
istics, such as if they are major commodity producers. It is the 
large and unsustainable imbalances that arise from policy dis-
tortions and structural deficiencies that should be the focus of 
attention, such as domestic product and factor market distor-
tions, financial market failures, structural issues in tax and ex-
penditure policies, deficiencies in social policies, distortions in 
external sector (trade, investment, exchange rate) policies, and 
inadequate international financial safety nets that affect econo-
mies’ saving and investment incentives/performance and com-
petitiveness. Adjustment time frames need to be flexible be-
cause structural reforms in many cases take time. 
Many of the policy distortions that give rise to unsustainably 
large imbalances also impede long-run sustainable growth. 
Much of the rebalancing agenda in fact comprises long-stand-
ing domestic structural reforms brought into sharper focus by 
the recent financial crisis. The variety of factors that can cause 
imbalances, and the differences in specific country circum-
stances, caution against approaches to address imbalances that 
may be overly simplistic or that aim for quick fixes.
The Role of Developing Country Growth
Rebalancing must be considered in a truly global context that 
factors in and leverages the role of developing countries in sup-
porting strong and more balanced global growth. In a progres-
sively multipolar world economy, the goals of global growth, 
rebalancing, and development are increasingly interlinked. 
With stronger growth, developing countries’ contribution to 
global growth has increased appreciably over the last two de-
cades. The map in figure 2 depicting countries’ contribution to 
global growth shows the multipolar pattern of recent global 
growth.
In 2010, developing countries, including emerging markets 
and other developing countries, contributed close to one-half 
of global growth (figure 3). While much of this growth contri-
bution comes from some large and dynamic emerging markets, 
many other developing countries have also improved their 
growth performance and have the potential to achieve stronger 
growth. Sub-Saharan Africa achieved annual growth of about 6 
percent in the five years preceding the recent financial crisis 
and is now rebounding quickly.
Developing countries’ share in world trade rose from 20 per-
cent in 1995 to close to 30 percent in 2009 (figure 4). Their 
share in world trade growth is higher still, because their import 
demand is rising at twice the rate of import demand in high-
income countries. Trade among developing countries, or 
South–South trade, has risen to 40 percent of total developing 
Source: IMF—WEO data/MAP projections. 
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country imports. Developing countries have led the recovery in 
world trade.
Looking ahead, developing countries will likely continue to 
lead growth in the global economy, with average growth in the 
medium term twice as high as in high-income countries (figure 
5). Also, developing countries’ growth, while varying in speed, 
is likely to range widely across developing regions. These projec-
tions are of course contingent on developing countries continu-
ing to pursue the macroeconomic and structural reform poli-
cies that have contributed to their growth momentum. 
The upshot of these figures on the growing role of developing 
countries and their improved growth prospects is that develop-
ing countries can be an important source of growth in demand 
to support the desired rebalancing of global growth—and achieve 
the MAP objective of strong, sustainable, and balanced growth. 
Developing countries offer abundant opportunities for high-re-
turn, growth-enhancing investments, such as in critical infra- structure that removes growth bottlenecks but that often re-
quires large, lumpy investments (also important are 
complementary investments in human capital). Many countries, 
however, face a binding financing constraint. Promoting growth 
in developing countries through more support for investment 
that removes bottlenecks to stronger growth would be a global 
win-win. It would support their development and it would con-
tribute to stronger growth at the global level and to the rebalanc-
ing of global growth—by creating new markets and investment 
opportunities and more sources of growth in global demand.
Investing in Developing Country Growth: A 
Win-Win for Rebalancing and Development
Rebalancing global growth and development financing can be 
linked in a virtuous circle. Three-quarters of developing coun-
tries are net importers of capital. However, in the aggregate, 
developing countries have in recent years run a surplus, main-
Figure 2. An Increasingly Multipolar Pattern of Global Growth (distribution of global growth shares [%], 2006–8)
Source:  World Bank staff estimates.
Figure 3. Rising Share of Developing Countries in Global Growth
Source:  World Bank staff estimates.
Figure 4. Developing Countries’ Rising Share in World Trade and 
Growing South–South Trade
Source: WDI database and UN Comtrade.
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ly reflecting the large surpluses of saving over investment in a 
few countries—notably China and developing oil and mineral 
exporters. So, considered as a whole, developing countries 
have recently been net exporters of capital to advanced econo-
mies—a phenomenon sometimes referred to as capital flowing 
uphill. Successful rebalancing in advanced deficit economies, 
thereby reducing their borrowing needs, would allow more of 
the surplus global savings to flow to support investment and 
growth in developing countries, which in turn would generate 
more import demand to reinforce global rebalancing and 
growth. The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made a 
similar point at the G-20 summit in Seoul when he called for 
“recycling” more of the surplus global savings to investment in 
developing countries as part of the global growth and rebal-
ancing agenda.
Infrastructure gaps are large across the developing world (fig-
ure 6). Infrastructure investment and maintenance needs in 
developing countries are estimated at $900 billion plus annu-
ally; actual spending is a little over half that level—about $500 
billion annually. The gaps are especially large in low-income 
countries. Helping to build financial and institutional capaci-
ties for infrastructure investment in these countries―by cata-
lyzing scaled-up and coordinated efforts by governments, inter-
national institutions, and the private sector―can be a key area 
for G-20 collective action to support the shared objectives of 
growth and development.
Financing for Investment and Growth
Private capital flows to developing countries have recovered 
from the sharp fall during the peak of the recent financial crisis, 
but, in the aggregate, they are likely to remain well below precri-
sis levels, partly because of persistent weakness in bank financ-
ing (figure 7). For the medium term, recent analyses, including 
a recent study by McKinsey Global Institute (2010), suggest 
that capital markets will tighten, and interest rates will rise. Fac-
tors contributing to that outlook include demographic devel-
opments, China’s plans to encourage more domestic consump-
tion, tighter financial sector regulation and banking system 
consolidation, concerns about elevated sovereign debt levels 
and potential for crowding-out, and rising investment demand 
in emerging markets that could combine to reduce the supply 
of capital while increasing the demand for it. 
Several emerging markets have seen a strong surge in capi-
tal inflows, especially portfolio inflows, in part driven by very 
low interest rates in advanced economies (figure 8). Indeed, 
some countries have taken policy actions to restrain the in-
flows, concerned about the macroeconomic implications of 
capital flow volatility and the potential for new bubbles. There 
is ongoing work in the G-20 on policy responses to capital flow 
surges. More recently, there have been indications that portfo-
lio (“hot money”) flows to emerging markets are beginning to 
moderate.
But not all developing countries have been awash with 
capital inflows. East Asia and Latin America have seen a surge 
in inflows, but Europe and Central Asia, South Asia, and Af-
rica not as much. The pattern of private capital flows across 
developing countries is highly concentrated and uneven. Five 
emerging market economies―Brazil, China, India, Mexico, 
and Russia―account for more than two-thirds of gross private 
capital flows to developing countries. The distribution of the 
flows may have become even more concentrated postcrisis, be-
cause the recovery in portfolio flows has been concentrated in 
a few major emerging markets (figure 9). Many developing 
countries, especially low-income countries, in contrast, face 
the prospect of scarcer and costlier capital in the postcrisis pe-
Figure 5. Growth in Developing Countries: More Resilient and with Stronger Prospects Than in Advanced Economies
Source: World Bank staff estimates.
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riod—especially for capital that supports long-term growth 
and development.
For developing countries with limited access to private capi-
tal markets, official flows (multilateral and bilateral) remain 
important, or perhaps take on added importance, both in di-
rectly providing development finance and in leveraging private 
capital. Fiscal stress in donor countries heightens the need to 
supplement traditional financing with innovative forms of fi-
nance, including risk-mitigation guarantee and insurance 
mechanisms for private investment, public-private partner-
ships, sovereign wealth fund investments, South–South fi-
nancing, and carbon finance.
Financial Sector Reform
The World Bank has also addressed the role of financial sector 
reforms in the context of the MAP discussions. Financial regula-
tory reforms are crucial to global financial system stability.  En-
couraging progress is being made in this area, including the Ba-
sel III reforms. It is important to ensure that these reforms do 
not have unintended adverse consequences for financial flows to 
developing countries, such as trade finance, or for their financial 
sector management given differences in the level of financial de-
velopment and in structural and institutional characteristics. 
Developing countries will need expanded technical and capaci-
ty-building assistance to help them implement higher stan-
dards, adapted to their specific circumstances. This can be an-
other important area for G-20 support, complementing ongoing 
efforts in financial inclusion to improve access to financial ser-
vices by underserved populations and small and medium enter-
prises. Financial sector development is central to stronger mobi-
lization by developing countries of their own resources.
Open T rade and Investment
Finally, the World Bank has underscored the role of open trade 
and investment in growth and rebalancing. While open protec-
tionism has been resisted relatively well since the global finan-
cial crisis, there is concern that opaque protectionism might be 
on the rise. Measures such as antidumping actions, safeguards, 
preferential treatment of domestic firms in bailout packages, 
and discriminatory procurement have increased. G-20 mem-
Figure 7. Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries: Recovering, but Likely to Remain below Precrisis Levels
Source: World Bank staff estimates.
Figure 8. Strong Surge in Capital Flows Complicating Macroeconomic Management in Some Emerging Markets
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bers account for close to two-thirds of the trade-distorting mea-
sures implemented by governments worldwide in the postcrisis 
period between November 2008 and November 2010 (figure 
10). Strengthening multilateral trade disciplines and moving 
ahead with the Doha Round are important areas for action and 
merit a more forceful commitment from the G-20. For less de-
veloped countries, improved market access needs to be comple-
mented with stronger trade facilitation and aid-for-trade pro-
grams to enhance their trade capacity. 
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Figure 9. Capital Flows to Developing Countries: A Tale of Contrasts
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Figure 10. Open Protectionism Resisted, But Opaque Protectionism on 
the Rise
(Trade measures implemented worldwide and by G-20, November 
2008–November 2010)
Source: GTA database.
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